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Hong Kong has a rapidly aging population and so the government decides to launch 
the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) in year 2000 to provide the elderly with some 
kinds of old age protection. It is interesting to know the impact of the coming MPF 
system on the Hong Kong economy, in particular, the impact of the MPF on 
aggregate savings in Hong Kong. Considering there are no consistent results of the 
effect of the mandatory saving on aggregate savings，the validity of the MPF system 
on aggregate savings therefore, can only be solved through empirical analysis. 
Nevertheless, no data was available for studying the MPF system in Hong Kong. 
Hence, the Singapore Central Provident Fund (CPF) will be studied and then, applied 
the results to forecast the impact of the MPF in Hong Kong. The empirical results in 
Singapore indicate that the CPF system increases the aggregate savings in Singapore� 
If Hong Kong follows Singapore's experience, then the coming MPF would also 
have positive impact on aggregate savings in Hong Kong. The magnitude of the 
impact cannot be estimated at this stage and therefore, this paper is aimed at 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Hong Kong is going to launch the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) in year 
2000. This long-term old age protection system affects three millions workforce. 
Therefore, it is interesting to know the impact of the coming MPF system on the 
Hong Kong economy. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government 
(HKSAR) claims that the coming MPF system will have positive impact on the 
economic development in Hong Kong because it can increase capital accumulation 
and the wealth can convert into productive investment, which can boost the economy. 
This claim is verified if the coming MPF scheme can raise the aggregate savings in 
Hong Kong. Considering there are no consistent results of the effect of the 
mandatory saving on aggregate savings, the validity of the MPF system on aggregate 
savings therefore, can only be solved through empirical analysis. Nevertheless, no 
data was available for studying the MPF system in Hong Kong. Hence, the effect 
of the MPF system on aggregate savings can only deduce from other countries' 
experiences. Singapore is chosen since it has many favourable conditions as 
mentioned in chapter 4. Its results are then applied to forecast the impact of the 
MPF system in Hong Kong. 
In chapter 2, the objective for introducing the MPF system in Hong Kong and 
details of the MPF system will be discussed. Next, chapter 3 will analyse the CPF 
system in Singapore and chapter 4 will compare and contrast the CPF system with 
the MPF system. Afterwards, chapter 5 will review the economic literature 
discussing the impact of the pension system on saving. Following，chapter 6 will 
explain the two-period overlapping generations model, which has been applied to 
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provide theoretical support for the effect of pension system on saving. The details 
of estimation method and result interpretation will be discussed in chapter 7 and 
chapter 8 respectively. Finally, chapter 9 will forecast the impact of the MPF 
system on saving in Hong Kong and give a brief conclusion. 
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Chapter 2: Hong Kong Social Security System 
2.1 The Needs of Old Age Protection in Hong Kong 
The need for a form of comprehensive retirement provision in Hong Kong has 
been the subject of intense debate for over 30 years. Traditionally, the old 
generation will not depend on government provision when they retire. Instead, they 
expect their children to take care of their necessities when they retire. The young 
generation in addition, is willing to provide all necessities for the elderly since they 
are influenced by the traditional Confucian values. Despite of this cultural support 
network, the need for the government to provide retirement protection for the 
workforce has caught intensive attention due to a number of factors. 
Firstly, change in life style and social attitude break down the implicit bond 
between the young generation and the old generation. Capitalism and a trend to 
emphasize individuals over the community may be factors contributed to the break 
down of the traditional extended family structure. Therefore, increasing number of 
young people does not consider taking care of their parents in retirement as their 
responsibility. In addition, increasing number of parents does not expect their 
children to take care of them after they retire. Some elderly even prefer help from 
the government agencies. 
Secondly, good medical care, high living standard and good nutrition contribute 
to the increase in life expectancy in Hong Kong. Tn 1998, the life expectancy at 
birth was 76.9 years for men and 82.3 years for women/ People aged 65 and over 
1 Life expectancy at birth in Hong Kong is shown in graph 9. 
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account for about 10 percent of the population. This percentage will increase to 
16.7 percent by 2020 and to 28.5 percent by 2040." The demographic trend draws a 
vivid picture that Hong Kong like all developed countries is facing the aging 
problem and the pressure to provide a long term financial security system is urgently 
in need in Hong Kong. 
2.2 Current Situation in Hong Kong 
Currently, Hong Kong has three kinds of old age protection schemes. The 
Long Service and Severance payments, and the Occupational Retirement Scheme are 
employment related schemes while the Social Security Allowance Scheme is 
government provided scheme financed by tax revenue. 
2.2.1 Long Service and Severance Payments 
Under the Employment Ordinance，a full time employee can receive a 
Severance or Long Service Payment from his or her employer if he or she has been 
completed a certain period of service and is then dismissed or made redundant. 
Alternatively, he or she can get the payment if he or she reaches aged 65 or over and 
chooses to retire. The payment is calculated by two thirds of monthly wages for 
each year of service or HEC$15,000. The lesser one is picked and the maximum 
level of payment is set at HK$230,000 and will be increased to HK$390,000 in 2004. 
To receive the severance payment, the employees have to complete at least two years 
of service in the same company. The condition for getting long service payment is 
2 See graph 3b. 
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even more stringent. The employee has to service the company for at least five 
years before he or she can receive the payment. 
This system of long service and severance payments provides the workforce 
with some kinds of retirement protection and termination benefits. However, the 
employee will lose this lump sum if he or she resigns by his or her own before aged 
65. Moreover, the amount of long service and severance payments are small and 
therefore, not sufficient to provide a good protection for the retired workers. 
2.2.2 Social Security Allowance (SSA) Scheme 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government has a special kind of 
allowances for the elderly in Hong Kong called the Social Security Allowance (SSA) 
Scheme. Under the SSA, there are two kinds of allowances. The first one is 
called the Normal Old Age Allowance (NOAA) that provides monthly allowance to 
Hong Kong residents who are aged within 65 to 69. This kind of allowance is 
subjected to a declaration of income and assets that do not exceed the prescribed 
levels as shown in table 1. 
The second one is called the Higher Old Age Allowance (HOAA) that provides 
monthly allowance to Hong Kong residents who are aged 70 and over. This kind of 
allowance is non-means-tested. Thus, no assets and income declaration is required. 
However, both the NOAA and the HOAA are subjected to residence requirements. 
According to the Hong Kong Statistical Department, the number of cases receiving 
the HOAA and NOAA has increased from 420,000 in 1994 to 447,000 in 1999. 
Within five years, the number of cases receiving the old age allowance has increased 
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more than 27,000 as shown in table 2. 
Currently, the monthly allowance paid for NOAA is HK$625 and the monthly 
allowance paid for HOAA is HK$705. Since there is an upward trend on the 
number of elderly receiving the NOAA and HOAA, the public expenditure on these 
two schemes will be continued increasing. 
2.2.3 Occupational Retirement Scheme (ORS) 
The Occupational Retirement Scheme (ORS) is a voluntary retirement scheme 
established by employers as a benefit for their employees. There was no regulation 
for ORS before 1993. The ORS therefore，was opened to abuse since no guidelines 
had been given on investing the funds and benefit payment. Hence，the 
Occupational Retirement Scheme Ordinance (ORSO) was established on October 
1995. Under the ORSO, all retirement schemes setting up by the employers are 
required to register including those established prior to its enactment. Members of 
the ORS can request information on the scheme's assets with a written notice 
presented to the designated person. However, the notice must be signed by over 50 
percent of the scheme members in support of the request. At December 1998, there 
were 17229 registered schemes and 1976 exempted schemes. Under the ORS, the 
defined contribution scheme is more popular than the defined benefit scheme as 
shown in table 3. 
Comparing the ORS with the MPF, the ORS is more generous to employees 
than the MPF in general. For example, the employers contribute 75 percent of the 
total benefit under the ORS as shown in table 4 while they only contribute 50 percent 
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under the MPF scheme. Since the ORS is not fiilly vested and portable, therefore, 
employees leaving their companies would face certain loss in the accumulated 
benefit under the ORS. Consequently, the ORS can help the employers to retain the 
employees and so it is more generous than the MPF. 
Since about three quarters of existing ORS plans have been set up before the 
date of eligible exemption，therefore, most of the firms participating in the ORS can 
exempt from the MPF schemes. Some 5000 ORS plans running by small firms may 
downgrade their plans to match the MPF standards. Therefore, pension experts 
expect that half of the ORS plans will remain after the MPF commenced 
2.3 Review of the Development of Old Age Protection in Hong Kong 
The debate over what is best to provide for the elderly in Hong Kong has 
resulted in several failed proposals. A community Wide Retirement Protection 
System put forward by the government in 1992 and the Old Age Pension Scheme 
(OPS) proposed by the government in 1994 was both rejected. The OPS is a 
Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system and therefore, provides no links between 
contributions and benefits. Many countries operating this system are planning to 
reform it since the aging population increases the burden of the workforce. To 
support the increasing aging population, the current working population has to pay 
higher payroll tax. Therefore, the voice asking for reforming this kind of social 
security system is becoming louder and louder. Since this system failed to work in 
other countries in the face of demographic shifts, it is doubtful that it will work in 
Hong Kong. However, a group of people strongly argued that the OPS could 
provide current elderly immediate needs. The current elderly contributed so much 
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to the economic development in Hong Kong when they were young. Therefore, 
they desire better treatment from the government now and the society has the 
responsibility to provide them a good social security protection. The OPS turned 
out to be banned since the financial burden of this system would continue rising due 
to the adverse demographic shift and the Hong Kong government was not willing to 
finance it with increasing payroll tax. 
The government also considered the introduction of the Central Provident Fund 
(CPF). This scheme is adopted by the Singapore government in 1955 and is still 
using until now. Tt is a mandatory, government managed, employment-related 
scheme. Since it is government managed, the administration cost would be lower 
due to economics of scale. Moreover, it is a defined-contributions scheme and 
therefore, there is no intergeneration transfer. Employees can get back their 
contributions plus the investment return when they have reached the retirement age. 
The joint declaration between China and British government has decided the fate of 
Hong Kong future. Hong Kong government has rejected the CPF scheme because 
the transfer of sovereignty in 1997 raised the doubt about Hong Kong's bureaucrat 
ability. Hong Kong people were not confident in putting their retirement fund 
under government management. They were afraid that the political instability 
might damage their accrued benefits. 
Despite the decision to reject these proposals, the Hong Kong government has 
finally adopted new legislation to address the needs of the elderly in Hong Kong. 
This long awaited ordinance is called the Mandatory Provident Fund Ordinance， 
passed by the Legislative Council on 27 July 1995. 
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The ordinance provides the framework for the establishment of a system of 
privately managed, employment-related MPF schemes to accrue financial benefits 
for members of the workforce when they retire. The MPF system is an 
employment-related contributoiy system，under which members of the workforce 
aged between 18 and 65 are required to participate in and made contributions to 
registered MPF schemes. With the introduction of the MPF schemes， 
complemented by personal savings and the Comprehensive Social Security 
Assistance (CSSA) scheme. Hong Kong will have in place all the three pillars for 
old-age protection reconnmended by the World Bank. The mandatory, privately 
managed, fully funded contribution scheme, the publicly managed tax-financed 
social safety net, the voluntary personal savings and insurance to some extend can 
secure the future elderly in Hong Kong. 
2.4 The MPF System in Hong Kong: 
This is a privately managed employment related Mandatory Provident Fund 
(MPF). The MPF ordinance passed in August 1995 and its subsidiary legislation 
was passed in April 1998. After enacting two supplemented regulations in April 
1998, the legislation for the MPF has been completed and it will imply in year 2000. 
The contribution will be commenced in December of year 2000. According to the 
MPF ordinance, all employers and employees are required to participate in an MPF 
scheme or an exempted scheme like the Occupational Retirement Schemes that have 
met the statutory requirements on the implementation date of the MPF. A 
regulation body called the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (MPFA) is 
set up to monitor the MPF schemes, trustee operations and the investments of fund 
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managers to ensure that everything comply with the government requirements. 
The scope of the MPF system covers all employees aged 18 to 64 employed 60 
days or more. In addition，all self-employed people in this age group are also 
required to contribute to an MPF scheme for themselves. Nonetheless, some people 
are exempted from the MPF scheme. They include the self-employed hawkers, 
domestic helpers, civil servants, teachers of granted and subsidized schools, and 
expatriates working in Hong Kong for not more than one year or covered by their 
home country schemes. 
The MPF contributions are collected from both employees and their employers. 
The employees have to contribute 5 percent of their relevant income that includes 
bonuses, commissions, salary and allowances but excludes housing allowances. 
Their employers have to match their contributions. That means the total 
contributions from both sides are 10 percent of the relevant income of the employees. 
The upper and lower limits of the relevant income is HK$20,000 per month and 
HK$4,000 per month respectively. Therefore, the maximum monthly contributions 
is HK$2,000 from both the employees and the employers. Any excess amount is 
voluntary for both the employers and the employees. For employees with monthly 
income below HK$4,000, their contributions are voluntary. However, their 
employers must still make 5 percent contributions for them. 
The MPF is fully vested. Employees are entitled to one hundred percent of 
their benefits regardless of their length of employment. The benefits include 
amount due to contributions from the employers. Unlike the Long Service Payment 
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Scheme, employers cannot reduce benefit amount of their employees due to short 
period of service. However, their contributions can be offset against severance 
payments and long service payments paid to their employees. 
in addition, the MPF is also portable. Upon termination of employment, 
employees can choose to stay in the current Master Trust Scheme or transfer to 
another scheme provided by their new employers. There are total three kinds of 
schemes. The first kind is called the Master Trust Scheme that is suitable for small 
or median size companies. The second kind is called the Employers-sponsored 
Scheme that is suitable for large companies with employees more than 1000 and the 
last kind is called the Industry Scheme that is suitable for high labour mobility 
industries like construction industry. The accrued benefits of employees can be 
transferred among different schemes. 
Since the only target for the MPF is to provide for retirement lives, the benefits 
are preserved until aged 65. However, there are exceptions. The accrued benefits 
can be paid out upon early retirement at aged 60 or later，permanent disability, 
permanent departure from Hong Kong or death. In addition, if no contributions has 
been made by the employees for the past one year and their MPF account balance is 
below HK$5,000, then they can withdraw the balance in cash if they have no 
intention of entering the labour force again in future. Upon retirement, the 
employees can receive benefits comprised of their own contributions and their 
employers' contribution plus any earnings on those contributions in a lump sum 
payment. 
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In order to gain support from employers and employees, Hong Kong 
government has a generous tax treatment for the MPF contributions. There are 
three stages where the pension can be taxed. They are the pension contributions, 
the investment earnings and the disbursements. Employers' pension contributions 
are tax deductible as a business expense up to 15 percent of their employees' 
remuneration. Similarly, contributions by employees are also tax deductible subject 
to a maximum of HK$ 12,000 per year The investment earnings and the 
disbursements of the pension are also exempted from tax. 
2.5 The Policy Issues of the MPF System 
Blinder (1988) has provided a full discussion of the reasons for the government 
to set up the retirement pension system such as the market failure and paternalism. 
Therefore, the discussion below would focus on the policy issues of the MPF. 
Firstly, in a television program produced by Ratio Hong Kong discussing the 
MPF system, some scholars criticized that the contribution rate of the MPF system is 
too low. They claimed that the 5 percent contribution rate from the employers and 
the employees could not accumulate enough benefit for the pensioners, especially for 
those low wage earners. However, higher contribution rates would cause greater 
distortions on employees' consumption decision. Although the per capita income 
in Hong Kong is lower than in Singapore, the private consumption in Hong Kong is 
higher than in Singapore. It is because the Singapore citizens have to contribute 20 
percent of their income to the CPF while Hong Kong citizens do not have to make 
any compulsory saving until now. Therefore, people living in Hong Kong have 
higher percentage of disposable income then people living in Singapore. 
1 3 
In addition, if the contribution rate is set too high, the low wage earners may 
have to seek help from charities or the government since they may not have enough 
money left after making the contributions to the MPF to consume the necessities. 
Furthermore, high MPF contribution rate may discourage capitalists from making 
investment in Hong Kong. Tt may increase the labour cost of production and hence 
the capitalists may prefer other countries with lower cost of production� Therefore， 
high MPF contribution rate may decrease the competitiveness of Hong Kong. 
The level of contribution rates is restricted by the above factors. Therefore, it 
is true that the MPF schemes cannot provide enough saving for retirement. 
Consequently, the government should encourage people to have private saving and 
long term planning for their retirement. 
Secondly, the MPF is a defined-contributions plan. The employers only need 
to make the relevant contributions and once the contributions have been made, the 
employer side does not have to bear any investment risk. All investment risk is 
borne by the employees. Although the employers do not have to bear any 
investment risk, they have the right to choose the service providers of the MPF for 
their employees. This kind of arrangement can lower the administration cost and 
make it simple for the employers to make MPF contributions for their employees. 
However, the goal of the employers and the employees is not exactly the same. The 
employers (the agent) may choose service providers that have business connections 
with their companies and ignore the benefit of their employees (the principal). 
Although all service providers do provide a basket of funds with different level of 
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risk for the employees, the principal-agent problem still cannot be eliminated. It 
can be solved if the employers have to bear parts of the investment risk or the 
employees can choose their own service providers. 
Another issue that related to defmed-contributions plan is whether it is better 
than detlned-benefits plan. People often argue that the defined-benefits plan is 
better than the defmed-contributions plan because pensioners under the 
defined-benefits scheme do not need to face investment risk. However, the benefit 
formulas of defined benefit plan are redefined frequently, so substantial political risk 
remains. Tn addition, the defined benefit formulas whether in public or 
employer-sponsor typically depend heavily on earnings during the last few working 
years. Therefore，workers are subjected to the risk of their wages will unexpectedly 
fall at the end of their career (example, due to illness or layoffs) and thereby pulling 
down their pensions as well. Before 1981, Chile was operating the PAYG 
defined-benefits system. Under this system，the pensioners have to face the risk of 
increasing tax or cutting down the payments when the government cannot afford the 
social security expenditure. Another example of the defined-benefits scheme is the 
Long Service Payment Scheme. The employees have to face the risk of their 
companies' bankruptcy or their wages dropped before they retire. 
Conversely, with a good regulation body, the investment risk under the 
defined-contributions plan can be minimized. For example, Chile is operating a 
defined-contnbutions plan now. The government guarantees a minimum level of 
retirement fund. Therefore，the government has shared part of the investment risk 
for the employees. The Chile government does not have to worry that pensioners 
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will take advantage of the minimum sum guarantee by investing their funds in risky 
assets since the investment assets in Chile's pension system are very restrictive and 
limited. However, Hong Kong has already had a matured financial market and the 
fund managers under the MPF system are permitted to invest in a wide range of 
assets with different risk levels. Therefore, it is no good for the government to 
provide the minimum sum guarantee of the MPF system since the pensioners might 
free ride this guarantee and allocate their retirement funds to highly risky investment. 
Instead, the Hong Kong government focuses on the regulation of the MPF system. 
The MPFA provides close monitoring on custodians, the service providers and the 
fund managers. Also，there is a fund established to compensate pensioners' losses 
due to non-investment faults. Therefore，defined-benefits plan may not be superior 
to defined-contributions plan. 
Thirdly, the accrued benefit of the MPF is in the form of lump sum. That 
means the pensioners have to face the longevity risk. Given the same amount of 
lump sum, people with shorter retirement period may leave part of their lump sum as 
bequest. However, people with longer retirement period may use up their lump 
sum and turn to charities or government to support them. With increasing life 
expectancy in Hong Kong, majority of pensioners will probably belong to the second 
category. In addition, the inflation rate in Hong Kong is high compared with other 
developed countries. Therefore, if the lump sum retirement fimd is not investing in 
some assets that can catch up with the inflation rate, it will depreciate very fast. To 
eliminate the longevity and inflation risk, the Hong Kong government should 
encourage the insurance firms to provide some forms of indexed life time annuities 
so that the pensioners have the choices to purchase the life time indexed annuities. 
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Otherwise, the government still has to cany the burden of providing retirement living 
cost for those who have used up their retirement funds. 
Fourthly, the MPF system does not provide any medical scheme. The 
government is planning to privatise the public medical provision. The government 
is planning to charge a higher price for the public medical service so that the cost and 
revenue of providing it can break even. Although the government still not executes 
the medical reforms, the user paid principle is expected to launch in the near future. 
The elderly are the high frequency users of the medical service. Therefore, they are 
expected to pay more for the medical service. However, the MPF system does not 
include any medical saving scheme and currently, only a minority of people have 
bought medical insurance. Therefore, most of the elderly will not have medical 
protection upon retirement since the accrued benefits of the MPF are insufficient to 
support both the living and medical expenses of the elderly. If the government does 
not introduce some forms of mandatory medical insurance accompanied with the 
MPF scheme, it has to prepare continued subsidizing the medical expenses of the 
elderly in the near future. 
Lastly, the tax treatment of the MPF may increase the income inequality. 
From the employee side, only high wage earners fall into the tax web. Therefore, 
they can benefit from tax deduction. Their lifetime wealth will be increased 
because they can get extra tax deduction benefit. However, the low wage earners 
may be worse off because not only they do not fall into the tax web，but also they 
may have to pay more indirect tax. As the direct tax revenue of the government 
decreases due to tax deduction of the MPF schemes, the government may need to 
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introduce some other kinds of taxes like the sales tax to finance the public 
expenditure. Therefore, the low wage earners may be worse off. From the 
employer side, they have to bear the cost of contributing to the MPF but their 
contributions are tax deductible up to 15% of their employees' total annual 
emoluments. Moreover, contributions made by the employers could be used to 
offset the long service and severance payments. Therefore, the tax deduction of the 
employers can be considered as extra benefits. The actual contributions of the 
employers are much lower than the virtual contribution rates. Therefore, the 
employers will not be considered as worse off. 
If tax deduction increases the income inequality, then the government must have 
some strong reasons to impose the favourable tax treatment. The regime for 
providing preferential tax treatment is to impress the employers and the middle upper 
class to support the MPF system. From the median voter theory, the government 
must gain support from the middle class. Otherwise, the legislation of the MPF 
rules cannot pass the Legislative and Executive Council. Moreover, deduction of 
the MPF contributions can reduce the opposition from the employer side. The 
reduction in tax revenue from tax deduction of the MPF system; furthermore, can be 
compensated by the drop in social security expenditure for the elderly in future. 
This few years, the average growth rate of the social security expenditure remains 
more than double the average growth rate of other government expenditures. The 
heavy burden of social security expenditure is expected to reduce after introducing 
the MPF scheme. Therefore, the government can be better off in long run although 
its current revenue will drop due to tax deduction. 
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Chapter 3: Singapore Social Security System 
3.1 The Needs of Old Age Protection in Singapore 
The World Bank has classified Singapore as high-income country. With 3.9 
millions of total population, the Singapore resident population only accounts for 3.2 
millions. The growth rate of total population is 3.5 percent while the growth rate of 
Singapore resident population is only 1.9 percent. Like Hong Kong，the total 
fertility rate is dropping from 1865 in 1990 to 1500 in 1998, which is below the 
population needed to replace itself. On the other hand, the life expectancy at births 
in 1998 is 75.2 for male and 79.3 for female.^ Comparing with the past, the average 
life expectancy at birth from 1990 to 1995 is only 74.9. In addition, the population 
of the resident aged 65 and above has reached 225,000 in 1998.4 ^he combining 
results of longer life expectancy and lower fertility rate show that Singapore also 
needs old age protection system. 
The dependency ratio (Residents aged under 15 years and those 65 years and 
over divided by the residents aged 15-64 years) increases from 41.8 in 1987 to 42.1 
in 1998. The proportion of residents aged over 65 to the total population increased 
from 5.7 percent in 1987 to 7.1 percent in 1998.5 the corresponding share of 
people aged under 15 declined from 23.7 percent in 1987 to 22.5 percent in 1998. 
Consequently, the age dependency ratio (Population aged 65 years and over divided 
by those aged 15-64) has increased from 8.2 percent in 1987 to 10.1 percent in 1998. 
Tt is estimated that by year 2040，25.7 percent of the resident population of Singapore 
will be above 65 years of age, while the age dependency ratio will increase to 44.9 
3 See graph 10. 
1 9 
percent.^ Therefore, the social security arrangement is very important for the social 
stability of Singapore. The main vehicle for approaching this goal is the CPF 
system. It is a defmed-contributions fiilly funded scheme based on the individual 
account. In addition, Singapore like Hong Kong also has a means-tested public 
assistance scheme. It is a very stringent and officially designed to provide less than 
minimum subsistence level of income. 
Before discussing the CPF system, it is worth to mention two other pension 
systems operating in Singapore. They are the Government Pension Scheme and the 
Savings and Employees Scheme. The first one is designed for the government 
employees. The scale of this system has been contracted since some of the public 
employees have been transferred to the CPF system. Currently, only new 
employees in the designated services and the political appointees are on this pension 
system. After retirement, the pensioners may choose the payment in the form of 
monthly pension until death, a lump sum payment or a combination of the two. 
Contrast to the CPF, the Government Pension Scheme is a non-contributoiy 
unfunded scheme with pension benefits being paid on PAYG basis. The second one 
is designed for the armed forces and managed by a broad of trustees appointed by the 
Armed Forces Council. Unlike the CPF, there is no salary ceiling on contributions. 
In addition, it is more generous than the CPF because the government wants to 
encourage the military officers to stay in service for a longer period. The 
government will contribute extra amount to the officers' account after they service 
for a certain period Besides, pensioners in this system can continue enjoying the 
medical benefits after they retired. 
See graph 1 a 
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3.2 The CPF System in Singapore 
The CPF was set up by the British colonial administration under the Central 
Provident Act and came into force on 1 July 1955. Contributions are compulsory 
from both employees and employers. It is based on individual accounts that are 
fully vested and portable. Therefore, the entire accumulated balances belong to the 
members. Members of the CPF system will receive annual account statements and 
they can check their accounts' status at any time through the telephone hotlines or 
the online service provided in the homepage of the CPF. 
The CPF system has a variety of objectives. Therefore, it is not a single 
retirement scheme, but is a comprehensive social protection scheme. The 
introduction of different schemes to the CPF system can be seen from table 9. For 
example, the home ownership scheme, the pre-retirement investments schemes, the 
health insurance, and others like compulsory medical savings account and the 
minimum sum scheme designed to provide regular monthly income for people aged 
60. 
Since the Singapore CPF system has multi objectives, to meet the financial 
demand of such ambitious goals, the contribution rate from both employers and 
employees are very high. Beginning with 5 percent from both the employers and 
the employees in 1955, the contribution rate has increased to historical high in July 
1985 with 25 percent from both sides7 Tt then drops down slowly. Currently, the 
contribution rates are 30 percent of wages for employees aged 55 and below, 16.5 
5 See graph 3a. 
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percent for those within 55 to 60 years old, 9.5 percent for those within 60 to 65 
years old and 7 percent for those above 65 years old. 8 These rates not only provide 
the CPF members' needs, but also encouraged the continued employment of older 
workers. Given the 30 percent total contributions, the sharing of contributions for 
the employers and the employees are 10 percent and 20 percent respectively. The 
maximum monthly contributions for the employers and the employees are S$600 and 
S$ 1,200 respectively. In 1998, the average monthly earning for the employees is 
S$2,549 and the monthly salary contribution ceiling for the employees is S$6,000. 
Consequently, the ratio of the average monthly earning to the maximum salary 
ceiling is around 1 to 2.4. 
The CPF contributions are putting into three accounts. The Ordinary Account, 
the Medisave Account and the Special Account. The Ordinary Account savings can 
withdraw for buying properties, approved investments, insurance, education and 
transferring to finance parents' retirement account. The Medisave Account savings 
enable the members to pay for permitted hospitalisation costs and premium for 
health insurance scheme. Lastly, the Special Account savings are reserved for old 
age and contingency purposes. The distributions of the 30 percent contributions 
among the three accounts are 20 percent points for the Ordinary Account, 6 percent 
points for the Medisave Account and the left 4 percent points for the Special 
Account. Since 1 January 1999, the contribution into the Special Account has been 
reduced from 4 percent to 0 percent.^ 
6 See graph 3a and graph 11. 
7 See table 8. 
^ See table 10. 
9 Details of the contribution rates can be seen from the table 10. 
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Until September 1999, the total CPF member is 2.8 million with the aggregate 
member balance reaching S$88,561.7 million. That means the average balance per 
member is only S$31,629, which is far from adequate for retirement use. The low 
members' balance is due to high early withdrawals. During the period of July to 
September 1999，the gross contributions received and credited to the members， 
accounts is S$2,890.6 million while the withdrawal released is S$3,003.4 million， 
Overall, the net members' balance is negative S$112.8 million. Therefore, 
extensive withdrawals before retirement contribute to the low members’ balance. 
As shown in table 9, there are many plans under the CPF system that permits early 
withdrawals. The health care schemes, the housing schemes and the asset 
enhancement schemes are the main sources of early withdrawals. 
The ratio of the number of contributors to members is decreasing. The CPF 
members include not only current contributors, but also those not contribute in 
current period but have made contributions at some point in time while the CPF 
contributors only include people currently make contributions to their CPF accounts. 
This ratio has dropped from more than 60 percent in 1973 to only 43 percent in 
1998.11 Another figure shows that less people contributing to the CPF is the ratio 
of contributors to labour force. This ratio increases from 53 percent in 1970 to 81 
percent in 1981. Then, it continues dropping and it is only 62 percent in 1998” 
Although there is still more than half of the labour force making contributions 
to their CPF accounts, Tnajority of the contributors belong to the low-income group. 
In 1998, contributors with monthly wage below S$1000 are 204,900 that account for 
iG Refer to the CPF pal homepage: http://www.cpf.sg. 
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17.8 percent of the total contributors. Those with monthly wage below S$2000 are 
632,900 (Account for 55 percent of the total contributors). 
After reaching aged 55, members of the CPF may withdraw their savings from 
their Ordinary and Special Accounts. However, a certain amount known as the 
Minimum Sum has to put into their Retirement Account for their old age. Also, 
they have to retain a certain amount for their Medisave Account, too. If they 
continue to work after aged 55, then they must still contribute to the CPF but at a 
lower rate. Part of their contributions will go to the Medisave Account until the 
Tnaximum is reached. Their savings after aged 55 may be withdrawn every three 
years. People leave Singapore and West Malaysia permanently or become 
permanently incapacitated, they can withdraw before aged 55. 
With population aging rapidly and increasing in life expectancy in Singapore, 
the CPF members must save enough to see themselves through the longer period of 
retirement. Therefore, the Minimum Sum Scheme (MSS) was introduced to help 
them set aside sufficient savings to support a modest standard of living during 
retirement. From 1 July 1999, the Minimum Sum for those turning 55 was set at 
S$60，000 for the individual (S$90,000 for a married couple) out of which S$40,000 
can be in pledged property and S$20,000 in cash. This amount will be increased 
S$5,000 a year until it reaches S$80,000 by the year 2003.^" Also, to encourage 
saving for retirement, a higher interest rate is paid in the Special Account. However, 
the sum reserved for retirement is not sufficient to provide a comfortable retirement 
life for the elderly in Singapore. 
“ S e e to graph 12. 
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Although employers have to contribute a lot to the CPF system, all of their 
contributions are exempted from tax. On the employee side, the interest credited to 
their accounts and contributions are exempted from income tax. In addition, upon 
retirement, the lump sum withdrawn is also free of tax. However, gratuities and 
pensions not related to the CPF are all taxed. Although the premiums paid to the 
insurance companies are not taxable; the sums received from the plans are taxable. 
Different tax treatments between the CPF schemes and other private pension plans 
have crowding out the private provision of pension plans in the market. 
12 See graph 13. 
Refer to the CPF pal homepage: http://www.cpf.gov.sg. 
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Chapter 4: The CPF in Singapore and the MPF in Hong Kong 
4.1 Reasons for Comparing the CPF in Singapore with the MPF in Hong Kong 
Since the MPF system in Hong Kong has not launched yet, there is no data 
available on the accumulated MPF wealth for carrying out empirical analysis. 
Instead of directly studying the MPF system in Hong Kong, other countries operating 
similar pension system would be studied. Although the Administradoras de Fonos 
de Pensiones (AFP) system in Chile is very similar to the MPF system in Hong Kong, 
it is not chosen to study. Firstly, the degree of economic development, saving 
habits and culture in Hong Kong and Chile are very different. Secondly, Hong 
Kong does not have any pension system before the introduction of the MPF system 
while Chile was operating the PAYG system before the introduction of the AFP 
system. Lastly, the AFP system launched in 1981 and so the data series is short for 
time series analysis. 
In contrast, the saving habit in Hong Kong is very similar to Singapore because 
both places are influenced by the Chinese culture. In addition, the degree of 
economic development is nearly the same. In addition, the CPF system in 
Singapore has launched in 1955 and there is more than forty years data available for 
carrying out the time series analysis. Although the CPF system in Singapore also 
has many institutional differences from the MPF system in Hong Kong, the analysis 
of the impact of CPF saving on aggregate savings in Singapore can still provide 
some predictions for the impact of the MPF system on saving in Hong Kong. 
Moreover, although Hong Kong and Singapore follow different economic 
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principles, the former follows the free market principle while the later follows the 
command market principle. Nonetheless, both places have very good economic 
performances. For example, in 1998，the per capita GNP in Singapore is 
US$36,060, and the average annual growth of GNP from 1988 to 1998 is 8.9 percent. 
Similarly, the per capita GNP in Hong Kong in 1998 is US$23,670, and the average 
annual growth of GNP during the same period is 4.5 percent. Moreover, the World 
Bank classifies both places as high-income p l aces , Thus, they have similar 
economic power and have the ability to provide similar level of social security 
protection. 
4.2 Comparing the CPF in Singapore with the MPF in Hong Kong 
General speaking, the CPF in Singapore is the same as the MPF in Hong Kong. 
The most important institutional difference is that the CPF is centralized publicly 
managed whereas the MPF is decentralized privately managed. A central feature of 
decentralized mandatory retirement saving scheme is that the private sector financial 
intermediates play a crucial role in investing and administrating works. Therefore， 
the cost of management would be high; yet, this kind of scheme can avoid direct 
linkage between government finances and retirement fund. In principle, under the 
publicly managed retirement scheme, the government has separated the government 
finance from the retirement funding. However, political constraints may force the 
government to finance the budget deficit by the retirement funding. Therefore, tax 
transfer is still possible under the centralized management scheme. 
The second difference is the function of the pension system. The only target 
14 See tables. 
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of the MPF in Hong Kong is to provide a lump sum for retirement use for the elderly 
in Hong Kong. In contrast, the CPF in Singapore not only targets at providing 
retirement fund for the elderly in Singapore, but also targets at raising funds for 
medical protection, housing protection and investment. Consequently, the CPF in 
Singapore is treated as a multi targets tool for the government to maximize the social 
utility. Singapore only provides very stringent public assistance to the poor because 
the CPF already aims at providing all rounds protection for their members. In 
contrast. Hong Kong provides a quite generous public assistance to people in need. 
The third difference is the fund performance. The rate of return to the MPF 
contributions will be followed by the financial market performance while the rate of 
return to the CPF Ordinary Account and the Special Account are regulated. For 
instance, the interest rate paid to the CPF Ordinary Account is the average of the 
twelve-month deposit and month end saving rate of the four major local banks, and it 
is risk free. The return to the CPF is expected to be higher than the return to the 
CPF because in general, the MPF invests in higher risk assets than the CPF. 
The last difference is the forms of fund payments. All the MPF funds can be 
withdrawn in a lump sum after reaching the retirement age while the members of the 
CPF system have to leave a minimum sum in their Retirement Account even after 
reaching the retirement age. In addition, members of the CPF have to leave another 
amount in the medical account for medical insurance. The details can be seen from 
section 3.2. 
On the contrary, the CPF system in Singapore and the MPF system in Hong 
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Kong also have many similarities. For example, both systems not only are based on 
individual account and fully funded, but also are portable and fully vesting. 
Moreover, they are both defmed-contributions plan，and both systems provide 
generous tax treatment to the pension fund contributions. 
4.3 Comparing the Impact of the MPF and the CPF on Aggregate Savings 
4.3.1 The Impact of the MPF on Aggregate Savings in Hong Kong 
The saving rate in Hong Kong is already very high comparing with the Latin 
American and Europe. The saving to GDP ratio in 1998 is 30.5. With so high 
percentage of saving ratio, can the MPF further increase the saving rate in Hong 
Kong? 
The essential point whether the MPF can increase the aggregate savings in 
Hong Kong depends on the substitution rate between private saving and the MPF 
saving. The MPF saving is unlike private saving because the liquidity is different. 
The MPF saving is locked up until retirement. Therefore, it cannot be treated as 
emergency money like the cash in hand. Hence, the MPF savings will not 
completely crowding out private saving. In addition, the real value of the MPF 
savings varies with inflation. The uncertainty of the real value of future accrued 
MPF wealth also lower the substitutability between private saving and the MPF 
saving. Furthermore, people may have no faith on the saving schemes of the MPF 
and hence continue privately saved for their old age. Also, for the high-income 
group, the heighten awareness of retirement saving would imply additional voluntary 
saving which will not crowd out by the MPF saving. For the low-income group. 
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borrowing constraint restricted them to spend future income and therefore, they are 
forced to save more than their voluntary savings. Therefore, the aggregate savings 
will increase. 
The rate of return to the MPF saving is expected to be higher than individuals' 
investment. The MPF savings of the individuals are pooled together into a large 
fund and then invested by fund managers who can diversify the risk over different 
financial markets. In contrast, most of the individuals are not experts on investment 
and some of them just deposit their cash into the banking accounts that have low rate 
of return. Even if they have the expertise in investment, their risk pooling ability is 
very limited since the balance of each individual's pension account is small. 
Therefore, the rate of return on private saving is expected to be lower than the rate of 
return on pension saving. Consequently, the MPF can increase the aggregate 
savings in Hong Kong. For example. Given there is seventy percent compliance 
from day one, and both employers and employees contribute 5 percent of the 
employees' relevant income, the MPFA estimates that the MPF system will produce 
HK$1.3 billion to HK$1.9 billion contributions in the first year. If there is no 
substitution effect between mandatory saving and private saving, then the aggregate 
savings in Hong Kong will increase more than one billion Hong Kong dollar in the 
first year. Since the funds are continued accumulated, the increase in aggregate 
savings after the MPF system is mature can be enormous. 
Before discussing the impact of the CPF on aggregate savings in Singapore, T 
would like to discuss the side effects of introducing the MPF system. It can 
stimulate the development of the financial market in Hong Kong. For example, the 
3 0 
AFP (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones) system in Chile has successfully 
stimulated the financial market in Chile. Modem banking supervision, new 
securities and corporation laws are reinforced after the introduction of the AFP. 
New institutions like the risk classification agencies of bonds are appeared. 
Currently, the financial market in Hong Kong is already quite mature. The 
introduction of the MPF system would further facilitate the regulation and 
supervision of the financial intermediates. Since the MPF statutory board requiring 
the allocation of 30 percent of the MPF assets to Hong Kong dollar denominated 
assets and the service providers must offer a capital preservation product in every 
fund. Therefore, the under-developed local bond market will be lift up after 
launching the MPF system. In addition, there will have increasing demand for fund 
managers, scheme administration service, rating agencies, trust and custodial service. 
4.3.2 The Impact of the CPF on Aggregate Savings in Singapore 
The gross domestic saving in Singapore is higher than Hong Kong. To 
illustrate, the percentage of the gross domestic saving to GDP is 51 percent in 
Singapore in 1998. The gross domestic saving in Singapore has shown an upward 
trend since the 1960. The increase in the CPF contribution rate may explain part of 
the increase in the aggregate savings. However, it cannot fxilly account the result 
since other factors like interest rate and economic growth may affect the aggregate 
savings, too. Besides, the function of the CPF system evolves from single 
retirement objective to multi social objectives. This change may affect the social 
structure and the social structural changes may then influence the saving habits. 
These multi linkages of the CPF system on the economy influence the aggregate 
savings in Singapore. Therefore, the indirect impact of the CPF system may also 
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contribute to the growth of aggregate savings in Singapore. 
If only the direct impact of the CPF system on aggregate savings were 
considered, then there would have two opposite effects that might affect the CPF 
system on saving. The first one is the substitution effect. As mentioned in chapter 
3, the CPF members can use their CPF account balance to buy properties, to pay for 
medical expenses and to invest in bonds and stocks market. Therefore, the CPF 
saving is more substitutable than the MPF saving. In the other words, the 
mandatory saving of the CPF has higher possibility to substitute voluntary saving 
than the MPF saving. The empirical evidence of Datta and Shome (1981) showed 
that there is no evidence of substitution between mandatory saving and voluntary 
saving in Singapore. Hence, the danger of the MPF saving substitutes the private 
saving in Hong Kong is even lower. 
The second effect is forced saving effect. The possibility of forced savings 
increases with the contribution rate of the CPF. The contribution rate of the CPF 
increased from 1960's to mid 1980's and then dropped slowly and level out recently. 
Therefore, the possibility of forced saving is highest during the 1980，s. Comparing 
the CPF with the MPF, the CPF contribution rate in Singapore is three times of the 
MPF contribution rate; therefore, the possibility of forced saving in Singapore is 
higher than in Hong Kong. 
Tn conclusion, the Hong Kong MPF has lower substitution effect and lower 
forced saving effect than the Singapore CPF. Since substitution effect has negative 
impact on aggregate savings while forced saving effect has positive impact on 
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aggregate savings, it is difficult to say which system is more effective in increasing 
the aggregate savings. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of the CPF system on 
aggregate savings cannot be accounted theoretically. The portion of the increase in 
aggregate savings due to the CPF system can only be found out through empirical 
analysis. 
However, the differences between with and without pension system can be seen 
from the brief statistics of Singapore and Hong Kong. The ratio of gross domestic 
saving to GDP in Singapore has risen from less than 10 percent in 1961 to around 50 
percent in 1998, Although we cannot sure that the sharp rise in saving is 
completely due to the introduction of the CPF system, the rising pattern is 
consistence with the changes in the CPF contributions. After the introduction of the 
CPF in 1955, the contribution rate has continued rising and peaked in 1984 whereas 
the saving to GDP ratio also has the same pattern in Singapore. During the same 
period, this ratio only rises steadily in Hong Kong. The saving to GDP ratio in 
Hong Kong is 10 percent higher than in Singapore in 1960, but it is 20 percent lower 
than Singapore in 1998.^^ These changes can be explained by the introduction of 
/ 
CPF in Singapore. Although both Singapore and Hong Kong enjoy high economic 
growth in the past few decades，the private consumption to GDP ratio in Singapore 
drops from 80 percent in 1960 to only 40 percent in 1998. However, this ratio only 
drops from 70 percent to 60 percent during the same period in Hong K o n g , 
Therefore, the CPF has successfully forced the Singapore citizens to save more. 
The trend of saving to GDP ratio can be seen from graph 6. 
16 The ratio of private consumption to GDP ratio is shown in graph 4. 
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Chapter 5: Literature Review 
Most studies of the impact of social security on aggregate savings are based on 
the ‘pay-as-you-go’ system. Little research has been done on the fully funded 
system. There are abundant of papers studying the United States social security 
system. The first person to study this issue is Martin Feldstein. After he has 
published his first paper in 1974 studying the effect of social security on aggregate 
private savings using the United States time series data, a lot of scholars challenge 
his results. To defence, he has published several papers studying the same issue 
afterwards. The surprising findings of social security reduces private savings 
stimulated much discussion and research both theoretical and empirical on the effects 
of the social security system. 
5.1 The Impact of Social Security Wealth on Aggregate Savings in United States 
Feldstein (1974) stated that the social security has two opposite effects on 
private saving. Social security reduces private saving through it substitutes for 
household assets that provide income during retirement. Therefore, it reduces the 
amount of saving during working years. On the other hand, persons who cover by 
the retirement scheme have an incentive to retire earlier since they have to retire 
from their current job before they can receive the pension. Therefore, the 
retirement period is lengthened and they need to save more for the longer retirement 
period. Consequently, the sign of social security on private saving depends on the 
strength of these two opposing effects. Tf asset substitution effect is stronger than 
the induced retirement effect，then social security will decrease private saving and 
vice versa. Therefore, Feldstein turned to empirical studies to investigate the 
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magnitude and direction of aggregate personal saving and the national accumulation 
of capital. 
Feldstein has adopted the life cycle consumption hypothesis (LCH) developed 
by Ando and Modigliani (1963) and added a social security variable to this 
consumption function. The social security variable captures the net effect of the 
induced retirement and asset substitution effect. Under this model, Feldstein 
assumes that there is no private voluntaiy intergenerationai transfer and all savings 
during working years is for the purpose of providing consumption during the period 
of retirement He applied the ordinary least square method to regress the consumer 
expenditure against current and lagged disposable income, non-social security wealth 
and social security wealth. The regression result shows that social security wealth 
has a positive effect on consumption with sample period from 1929 to 1971. 
However, it is not significant for post-war sample period from 1947 to 1971. 
Feldstein explains that the insignificant of the social security wealth in the post war 
period is due to data limitation. 
Bemheim (1987) said that the LCH implied the annuity market was perfect and 
consumers left no bequest. However, this assumption is not true for majority of 
consumers. To retain the LCH, he relaxed the assumption of perfect annuity 
markets and assumed that consumers could not adjust their annuity holdings on the 
margin. Under this assumption, he argued that simple discounting future social 
security benefits (ignoring the possibility of death) provided better valuation of 
social security benefits than actuarial valuation. Since Feldstein calculated the 
social security wealth based on actuarial valuation, Bemheim argued that it might 
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understate the depressive effect of social security on personal wealth accumulation 
by a factor of three or more. 
Following Feldstein's paper, Munell (1974) also did a similar empirical work. 
However, she used saving as dependant variable. She also incorporated the 
unemployment rate and two separate variables to capture the retirement effect and 
substitution effect. The estimated social security variable implied that there is a 
negative asset substitution effect of social security on saving while the retirement 
variable implied there is a positive retirement effect of social security on saving. 
On balance, social security wealth was estimated to have negative effect on saving 
but the magnitude is much less than Feldstein (1974). 
Barro (1978) gave no support for the hypothesis that the social security program 
depresses saving. He argued that the assumption of no intergeneration transfer in 
Feldstein (1974) is unrealistic. Parents make voluntary contribution to their 
children in the form of educational investment and bequests while children provide 
support for their aged parents. Such kind of transfer will affect the impact of social 
security wealth on private consumption as increased in social security wealth is 
accompanied by decreasing transfer from children to parents or increasing bequests 
from parents to children. Therefore, the downward effect of private saving would 
no longer be predicted. 
KotlikofF (1979a) supported that social security could have caused a major 
reduction in the capital stock for the United State data. Under partial equilibrium 
holding wage, return on capital and retirement age constant, he indicated that 
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unfunded social security reduced capital stock by around 40 percent. Although the 
magnitude under general equilibrium is much smaller, the life cycle model sill 
estimates a 20 percent steady state reduction in capital. Kotlikoff (1979b) also did a 
similar empirical work. He ran two regressions; one considered the effect of social 
security on private saving. The other considered the effect of social security on 
retirement age. Tn his work, he considers not only the intrageneration transfer, but 
also the intergeneration transfer. Since the present value of lifetime taxes paid in is 
not equal to the present value of benefit received, there is lifetime wealth increments 
or decrements due to social security system. The net worth of social security in his 
model captures the net effect of wealth increment while the accumulated social 
security tax in his model captures the intertamporal transfer without changing the 
lifetime budget constraint (Zero net wealth increment). His empirical results 
showed that social security tax contributions have reduced the private savings of the 
young but the coefficient of net social security wealth is not significant. Therefore, 
the saving of the old generation must increase to offset the reduction in saving of the 
young generation leaving zero impact on aggregate savings. In addition, his 
findings showed that social security did not significantly influence the expected 
retirement decision and so the introduction of social security would not induced early 
retirement. Furthermore, the results cast doubt on the ability of people to project 
accurately their social security benefits and their age of retirement. 
Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) replicated the empirical work of Feldstein (1974) 
and discovered that there is a computer programming error in Feldstein's paper. 
The replicated work did not provide statistically significant support for the 
hypothesis that social security decreased personal saving. However, Leimer and 
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Lesnoy applied an alternative measure of social security wealth and so their results 
cannot be compared with Feldstein (1974) due to different specification of variables. 
Bemheim and Levin (1989) regress accumulated wealth on social security 
benefits, present value of lifetime resources, the square of lifetime resources and the 
respondents' age. The regression results indicated that social security depressed 
personal saving roughly dollar for dollar for single individuals but no apparent 
relationship between expected benefits and accumulated wealth for couples. 
Leimer and Richardson (1992) combined the life cycle and altruistic 
consumption behaviour. Altruistic refers to all kind of private transfers that offset 
behaviour in response to social security and other government transfers. They have 
addressed the problem of no bequests in the life cycle model. Using cross sectional 
data of the United States, their model stated that a dollar of social security wealth 
substitutes for about three-fifths of a dollar of fungible assets. In addition, social 
security wealth reductions would have a positive and sizeable effect on private 
savings. 
Feldstein (1996) re-examined his 1974 paper with additional 21 years of data. 
Moreover, additional variables include government budget surplus, real per capita 
stock of consumer durable and product of unemployment and real per capita 
disposable income are added. The results still agree with his 1974 paper. 
Following Feldstein (1996), Meguire (1998) stated that treasury securities and 
private physical capital are more appropriate than household net worth to measure 
3 8 
private wealth. Also, the used of disposable income to capture the income in life 
cycle model in Feldstein's model is inappropriate. He also corrects the 
autocorrelation using the maximum likelihood estimator. In addition, the 
heteroskedasticity is addressed by weighting the equation with the lagged 
consumption. Furthermore, test has been performed on the structural change during 
the World War TT. The regression results confirm that social security wealth reduce 
private saving but not as large as the results ofFeldstein (1996). 
Coates and Humphreys (1999) checked the robustness of the findings of 
Feldstein (1996). Two restrictions have been imposed The first one is to check if 
the marginal propensity of social security wealth on private consumption is the same 
as the marginal propensity of household net wealth on private consumption. The 
second restriction is to check if the wealth on consumption is linear across different 
age group. In addition, square term of household net worth, social security wealth 
and total wealth are added to the model to test if they have any impact on private 
consumption. The results suggested that the influence of social security wealth on 
consumption rises with the level of wealth and the effect of social security is very 
sensitive to the specification of consumption function. 
5.2 The Impact of Social Security Wealth on Aggregate Savings in Other Countries 
Notwithstanding Canada's public pension plan was not like the United States 
pension system, Boyle and Murray (1979) had followed the LCH model adopted by 
Feldstein (1974) and Munnell (1976) to study the impact of Canada's pension plan 
on aggregate savings. He found out that Canada's public pension plans had no 
visible effect on household saving behaviour. No matter using Feldstein's model or 
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MunneU's model, the coefficients of pension wealth were consistently small and 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, the empirical evidence could not provide any 
evidence confirming a substitution between private saving and pension saving. 
Barro and Macdonald (1979) using cross-country data from 16 industrialized 
western countries based on the life cycle model to study the issue of social security 
on aggregate savings. The consumer spending equation in their paper was 
employed from various papers like Feldstein (1974) and Modigliani (1963). Their 
empirical results showed that when common intercepts were used for all 16 countries, 
there was a significant negative effect of social security on the ratio of private 
consumption to income. However, when individual intercepts were applied to the 
16 countries, there was a positive relationship between social security and the ratio 
of private consumption to income. Different treatments of the intercept term 
reflected the differences in the nature of cross sectional and time series movements 
in the independent variables. Therefore, the empirical studies do not support or 
reject the hypothesis that social security depresses private saving. 
Datta and Shome (1981) studied the substitution elasticity between compulsory 
savings and non-compulsory savings. He said that if the increase in compulsory 
savings through pension ftmd cost equivalent or even greater reduction in 
non-compulsory savings, then the mandatory saving schemes would not have 
positive impact on aggregate savings. They studied five Asian countries including 
Singapore，Malaysia, India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. They ran 
non-compulsory savings on compulsory savings for these five countries. The 
coefficients of the compulsory savings measured the net impact of forced saving. 
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substitution and education effect. Using both time series estimation for each 
country and pooled data for all countries except India, they found that there was no 
significant relationship between compulsory savings and non-compulsoiy savings in 
these countries. The time series estimation for Singapore showed that compulsory 
savings had positive impact on non-compulsory savings although it was insignificant 
at 95 percent confidence interval. Therefore, there is no danger of pension savings 
crowding out private savings in Singapore and other four Asian countries. 
Loh and Veall (1985) studied the effect of Singapore's public pension plan (the 
CPF) on aggregate savings based on the model of Barro and Macdonald (1979). 
The empirical results indicated that pension savings had negative impact on private 
consumption but the coefficient of pension wealth was insignificant at 95 percent 
confidence interval. However, the results are not very creditable since the sample 
period (1966 to 1979) is short for time series analysis. 
Giancarlo and Schmidt-Hebbei (1994) studied the pension reform and growth in 
Chile. The empirical results of the impact of pension savings on aggregate savings 
were significant. The coefficients of the share of private pension funds in GDP on 
private consumption were negative and significant at 95 percent confidence interval. 
The results suggested that part of the positive saving response could be related to the 
reduction in consumer myopia and the influence of involuntary saving by the 
consumers suffering from large myopia and borrowing constraints. However, the 
introduction of the AFP system caused structural and policy changes such as 
deepening in financial market that also contributed to the positive saving response. 
Therefore, the magnitude of the coefficients should be interpreted as the upper bound 
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of the influence of the pension saving on aggregate consumption. 
The empirical model in this paper will be based on Loh and Veall (1985). 
Their model was a modified version of Barro and Macdonald (1979) as mentioned 
above and the Barro and Macdonald's model was based on Feldstein's model and his 
model was based on life cycle model. Therefore, Lob and V e a l l m o d e l is also 
based on life cycle model. Despite of many people criticized the empirical validity 
of the life cycle model, the main tool to study the effect of social security on private 
saving is still the life cycle model. Since our current objective is not studying the 
validity of life cycle model. Instead, we want to apply this model to study the 
implications for empirical methodology. Therefore, we take the perception of this 
model as maintained hypothesis. 
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Chapter 6: The Theory 
Under the fully funded defined-contributions, compulsory saving plan, each 
contributor can get back all their contributions plus the accumulated return on their 
investment when they retire. Since the present value of the expected pension 
benefits should be equal to the present value of the contributions, no net social 
security wealth has been created. In addition, there is no intergenerational transfer 
under this system unless the government has subsidies and intervention. 
Consequently, the establishment of such system should not reduce saving. At the 
extreme, it can only fully substitute the private saving. For instance, if the 
compulsory saving rate is above the voluntary saving rate, the capital market 
imperfections inhabit borrowing on the strength of future income and no early 
withdrawals were permitted before retirement, the aggregate saving rate will increase. 
To illustrate the above argument, we have adopted the two period overlapping 
generation model, which is adopted by Blanchard and Fischer (1989). 
Assumptions: 
1 The economy only consists of firms and individuals and each individual only 
live for two periods. At time t, the young generation provides labour force and 
earns Wt. At time t+1，the young generation becomes the old generation and 
retired. Therefore, the young generation at time t has to save part of their 
income for consumption at time t+1. The savings of the young generation at 
time t generates the capital stock that is combined with the labour force 
provided by the young generation at time t+1 to produce output in period t+1. 
2 The number of persons bom at time t and working at time t+1 is Nt，and the 
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population growth is given exogenously at n. 
3 Firms only use capital and labour as inputs and the production function of the 
firms follow constant return to scale. In addition, the firms behave 
competitively. Therefore, all output goes to pay labour and capital. 
4 Firms taking rental rate on capital it as given. 
A Individuals 
Consider individuals bom in time t，their lifetime utility is: 
Consumption can increase utility but the marginal utility of consumption is 
diminishing when consumption increase. Therefore, 
U，〉0andir<0 
Besides, individuals prefer current consumption to future consumption given same 
unit of resource. Therefore, 
0>0 
Individuals maximizing utility subject to the budget constraints: 
Q + 二 
and 
Q+i 询 1 + � + � 
The maximization problem for the individual is then given as: 
二 r - / ( w r W + _ + � ] 
By taking first order differentiation with respect to St gives 
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4 二-Ww,-幻+ "’ [明 
dS, V ( t) \ + 0 
l o 
dS, 
, “ l + 6> 
This implies a saving function of the form 
St = Si (wi，r丨+1) (2) 
I s 
(As income increase, saving will also increase) 
必t o 
The sign of Sr is ambiguous because of offsetting income and substitution effect. 
B Firms 
Firms' production fimction 
K 
y = 丄 P r o d u c t i o n function follows constant return to scale 
L L 
y = f{k) Setting output per worker Y/L = y, and capital labor ratio K/L = k 
Assume production function satisfies Inada conditions 
f � 0 , f <0, limi,_of=oo and 1〜一�f 二 0 
The maximization problem for the firms: 
Considering the labour market, taking first order differentiation of the production 
function with respect to the labour supply will give the marginal productivity of 
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labour, which is equal to the labour wage Wt under perfect competitive market. 
Similarly, the marginal productivity of capital is equal to the rental price of capital n. 
The factor market equilibrium is also given by the following equations. 
and (3) 
m ) 二厂， 
C At equilibrium 
Lastly, considering the goods market, when goods market is at equilibrium stage, the 
capital stock at time t+1 must be equal to the saving of the young generation at time 
t. 
(l+n)kt+i = St(wt,rt+i) (4) 
Putting (3) into (4) gives, 
(1 + 举 , + � =S t i / i k , ) - k, / ’ {k, )1 / ’ ( ‘ � ) } 
dkt ClKj 
d k �- s j . r i K ) 
dK —i + n-&/”(‘） 
The equilibrium will be stable if 
代+1 < 1 
dkt 
Given the pension system is fully funded and the rate of return on pension saving is 
the same as the rate of return on any other kinds of savings, at time t+1, each 
individual can receive bt+i if he or she has contributed dt at time t. 
bt+i = dt(l+rt+i) 
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After introducing the pension system, equation (1) and (4) becomes 
一民一� ) :"丨 [ O W , )(二』 ( l + O (5) 
0 + … 众 = (w,, ) + � ( , ) (6) 
Comparing equation (1) and (4) with equations (5) and (6), it is clear that if kt 
solves the former set，it also solves the latter provided that dt < (l+n)kt十i. 
Consequently, as long as the required contributions under the fully funded scheme 
does not exceed the level of voluntary saving that would exist without the pension 
scheme, the introduction of a flilly funded scheme will not affect the level of 
aggregate savings. It is because the pension savings provide a return equal to other 
kinds of voluntary savings and therefore, consumers are indifferent between 
allocating their fbnds to pension savings dt and other kinds of savings St because 
there is perfect substitution between dt and St. However, if the pension savings dt is 
greater than the voluntary saving i.e. dt > (l+n)kt+i，then the aggregate savings would 
increase. 
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Let: St be voluntary savings before the introduction of pension scheme. 
St be voluntary savings after the introduction of the pension scheme 
dt be the amount of pension contributions 
Before the introduction of pension system, 
St(wt,rt+i) 二 （1 十 n)kt+i 
After the introduction of the pension system. 
Case 1: No forced saving 
dt < St and so dt < ( l+n)kt+i 
For perfect substitution between dt and St, 
dt+st 二 St = (l+n)kt+i 
Therefore, consumption at period t maintains unchanged as shown below. 
Graph 1: dt <(l+ii)kt+i 
t+1 
K 
C Y t 






Case 2: Have forced saving 
dt > St and so dt > (l+n)kt+i 
Under perfect substitution between dtand St, the pension savings completely crowds 
out voluntary savings. Consumption in period t will decrease. 
Graph 2: dt〉（l+n)kt+i 
t+1 
j ‘ i r The amount of forced 
saving is (C'-C)=dt-St 
dt(l+rt+i)  
S t ( l + W 1........ 
1 r x ： i ^ — • t 
C， C Y 
^ V ^ 
St 




Chapter 7: Empirical Set Up 
7.1 The Data 
High frequency data was not available for population by age group and the 
unemployment rate in Singapore. Therefore, annual data will be used. Early 
annual data on unemployment rate and population by age group was also not 
available. To maximize the data series, two regressions with different sample 
periods will be performed. One with sample period from 1961 to 1998, runs private 
consumption against government consumption, lagged income and pension wealth. 
The other one with sample period from 1967 to 1998, runs private consumption 
against government consumption, lagged income, unemployment, ratio of population 
aged 65 and over and the pension wealth. Most of the variables in this paper 
follow the definition of Loh and Veal's paper except the age variable. The age 
variable has been defined as the proportion of people aged 65 and over because the 
life expectancy and the retirement age in Singapore has been increased. Besides, 
there was no data available on disposable income in Singapore, following Loh and 
Veall, gross domestic product would be used instead. Furthermore, two measures 
of pension wealth are applied. The CPF amount due to member measures the net 
aggregate overall balance of the CPF account annually while the CPF amount 
contributed measures the aggregate contributions to the CPF annually. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to convert all Singapore dollar term 
variables to 1990 constant price because early data on GDP deflator in Singapore 
was not available. The conversion is performed by the following equation. 
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rpj 
rpj — 乂 i airrcnt i qq 
C r /jyyy 
y 一 current 
(1990) — - ^ j 
Where X is any Singapore dollar term variable. 
Data source, units and variable construction can be seen from the data appendix. 
7.2 The Model 
The regression model follows closely with the model of Loh and Veail (1985) 
except that the age variable has been changed to the population aged 65 and over. 
The data source and the definition of the variables are shown in the data appendix. 
The model is shown below: 
Where 
Ct is the private consumption at time t 
Yt is the gross domestic product at time t 
Gt is the government consumption at time t 
Yn is the lagged gross domestic product at time t 
CPFt is the pension savings at time t 
A65t is the ratio of population aged 65 and over to total population at time t 
Ut is the unemployment rate at time t 
Two measures of the CPF (The SSi and SS2) have been applied. Therefore, 
there are two regression equations as shown below: 
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Ci/ 二 + + + <^ 3^ 2/ + + 以5义65, + a^Uj + St 
And 
Ci, = 口0 + afi^^ + a^Y^, + a^Y^^ + a^SS2t + + a^U, + s^ 
Where 
Cit is the ratio of private consumption to gross domestic product at time t. 
Git is the ratio of government consumption to gross domestic product at time t. 
Yit is the ratio of lagged gross domestic product to current gross domestic product. 
Yix is the reciprocal of gross domestic product at time t. 
SSit is the ratio of CPF amount due to member to gross domestic product at time t. 
SS21 is the ratio of CPF amount contributed to gross domestic product at time t. 
The intercept ao is the short run marginal propensity to consume and therefore, 
should be within 0 and 1� Gi is added to the equation to see if there is any 
substitution effect between the government consumption and private consumption. 
The sign of ai is indecisive. For example, during the economic depression，private 
consumption would contract while the government consumption would expand due 
to increase in social security expenditure. In addition, the government would try to 
increase consumption through some infrastructure projects so that the total 
consumption will stop dropping and the economy will not dampen further. Under 
this case, ai is expected to have a negative sign. However, during economic boom， 
both the private consumption and government consumption may increase 
simultaneously. Consunners are wealthier during the good times and willing to 
consume more. At the same time, government revenue would increase due to 
increase in profit and income tax. Consequently, the government can spend more 
but still maintain the budget balance. Under this case, the sign of ai can be positive. 
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If during the sample period, there were more economic good times than economic 
bad times, then ai would expect to have positive sign. 
Another variable that may influence private consumption is the lagged income 
(Yi), which is a cyclical measure intended to account for any differences between 
current and permanent income. For example, if the income in last period is high 
and consumers anticipate higher income in the following period, then private 
consumption in the following period would be increased. Therefore, a: is expected 
to have positive. 
Considering the pension wealth variable, the CPF amount contribute (SS2) and 
the CPF amount due to member (SSi) are applied to see if different measurement of 
pension wealth would change the effect of compulsory saving on private 
consumption. The results can then apply to determine the impact on the aggregate 
savings. Under the life cycle hypothesis, the fully funded social security should 
have no impact on savings and a4 is expected to be zero. However, if CPF changes 
the consumers' propensity to consume, then a4 can be non-zero. For instance，if 
people are forced to save more than their voluntary saving, then 04 can be negative 
since less is left for them to consume. 
The impact of the old age variable (population 65 and over relative to total 
population) on consumer consumption is more difficult to interpret. If the variable 
proxies for the fraction of the population that is retired and hence in a steady state, 
also for the fraction of planned time spent in retirement，then there would be a long 
run positive relation of the age variable to the desired ratio of wealth to income. 
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Therefore, for a given positive growth rate of real income, the effect of the A65 on 
Ci (as) would be negative. However, for a given set of saving plans and a given 
steady state age distribution, an increase in current ratio of retired persons to total 
population would increase the fraction of people who have a high propensity to 
consume, so that as would be positive. An additional problem of interpretation is 
that A65 need not be proxy of the fraction of retired persons，since increased life 
expectancy and the associated improvement in health throughout the life cycle would 
tend to raise both the working and retirement spans. 
Lastly, the unemployment rate is added to the regression to account for the 
differences between current and permanent income. The expected sign of a6 is 
negative since during high unemployment period, private consumption would expect 
to drop. 
7.3 Method of Estimation 
The data series of private consumption and GDP in Singapore show upward 
trends and variables with upward trends are not stationary. To reduce the incidence 
of spurious regression, all potentially non-stationary variables are scaled down by 
current GDP. An alternative procedure base on unit root and co-integration tests 
and a dynamic error correction model specification are not feasible because of the 
small sample size. 
Tn addition, the time series data may have serial correlation problem and the 
simple Ordinary Least Square Method (OLS) may not give Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimator (BLUE). Therefore, both OLS and the Hildreth and Lu Method (HL) are 
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used to run the regression. The procedure for the empirical work is to run the 
equation using OLS checking the basic testing like normality, serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity of the residuals. The Langrange Multiplier (LM) test is applied 
to check for higher order serial correlation because the first order serial correlation is 
detached from the results of OLS estimation. After confirming the order of serial 
correlation, the HL estimation is applied to the equation. Finally, variable deletion 
test would be done. 
The HL estimation method provides exact maximum likelihood (ML) estimates 
of the parameters under the assumption that the disturbances, Ut follows stationary 
processes with "stochastic initial values" as shown below: 
jJR(l) ： Ut 二 十 
or 
AR{2): w,=广+ 广2 以卜2 + St 
AR(l)Case: 
W 二 T ^ l - p 
AR(2) Case: 
r 广 、 � P i ) P ) = V(U.2 ) = J ^ 7Z N 
Cov{u,，) 二 7； 、广 ^ 
That means the initial values (u^ for the AR (1) process, and Ti^  and u^ for 
the AR (2) process) are normally distributed with zero means and a constant variance 
as shown above. 
The HL estimation using the microfit program provides log-likelihood ratio test 
(LL) of AR (1) against the non-autocorrelated error specification and AR (2) against 
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AR (1). The specifications are given by 
ZARWLS - 2(丄丄• - LLOU )�；IFI� 
XAR2,AR\ 二 从LL船-LL皿)〜；Jfi 
Both of the above statistics are asymptotically distributed. The log-likelihood 
values, LLols, LLari and LLar2 represent the maximized values of the 
log-likelihood functions. Details of the HL estimation can be seen from Microfit 
menu guide p.370 to 375 and the empirical results of the HL estimation would be 
presented on next chapter. 
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Chapter 8: Results Interpretation 
Table 7: Regression Results under the Hildreth and Lu Method (HL) 
lA IB 2A 2B 2C 2D 
1961-1998 1961-1998 1967-1998 1967-1998 1967-1998 1967-1998 
INT 0.39 0.41 0.11 0.97 0.12 0.15 
(7.19)* (8.28)* (0.58) (9.57) (0.78) (0.97) 
Gi 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.30 
(0.85) (0.81) (0.85) (0.96) 
Y, 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.03 
(1.87) (2.14)* (0.41) (0.41) 
Yi 1247.7 1246.0 . . 2341.3 2337.6 2356.7 
(7.87)* (7.71)* (5.42)* (5.51)* (5.55)* 
SSi -0.21 -0.20 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.12 
(-3.73)* (-3.63)* (-2.14)* (-2.21)* (-2.25)* (-2.02)* 
A65 5.22 5.35 5.15 4.89 
(1.72) (1.88) (1.85) (1.79) 
U 0.04 
(0.12) 
P i 1.12 1.14 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.91 
(8.26)* (8.45)* (11.03)* (11.15)* (10.59)* (12.08)* 
P2 -0.55 -0.55 
(4.02)* (-4.08)* 
DW 2.14 2.12 1.65 1.65 1.70 1.63 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-ratio 
2. Dependent variable is the ratio of private consumption to income 
3. * The coefficient is significant at 95 % confidence interval. 
4. p ] and p 2 are the coefficient of AR (1) and AR (2). 
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3A 3B 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E 
1964-1998 1964-1998 1967-1998 1967-1998 1967-1998 1967-1998 1967-1998 
INT 0.39 0.40 0.20 0.31 0.39 0.40 0.45 
(8.13)* (8.44)* (1.30) (2.18)* (7.51)* (7.66)* (12.93)* 
Gi 0.34 0.40 0.32 0.34 0.08 
(1.24) (1.39) (1.14) (1.22) (1.32) 
Yi 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.07 
(1.95) (2.13)* (1.23) (1.10) (1.14) 
Y2 1210.0 1267.4 1926.0 1616.5 1382.3 1462.5 1557.1 
(7.02)* (7.29)* (4.04)* (3.79)* (6.33)* (6.87)* (7.83)* 
SS2 -1.14 -1.00 -1.03 -0.97 -1.00 -0.86 -0.69 
(-4.18)* (-3.90)* (-3.47)* (-3.34)* (-3.50)* (-3.23)* (-2.98)* 




P i 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.87 0.82 0.84 0.82 
(8.98)* (10.30)* (12.11)* (9.99)* (8.22)* (8.83)* (8.13)* 
DW 1.61 1.64 1.83 1.76 1.67 1.69 1.74 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-ratio 
2. Dependent variable is the ratio of private consumption to income 
3. * The coefficient is significant at 95 % confidence interval. 
4. p 1 is the coefficient of AR (1). 
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Although OLS estimation does not give best estimators, it is shown in table 6 as 
a comparison with the HL estimation. The results shown in table 7 indicate that all 
variables except unemployment rate maintain consistent sign through different 
models. Also，all variables' sign except government consumption Gi are the same 
as the paper of Loh and Veall (1985). In particular, social security variables (SSi 
and SS2) show negative impact on private consumption like the paper of Loh and 
Veall. However, They are significant in this paper while they are insignificant in 
Loh and Veail's paper. Therefore, this paper different from their paper has shown 
that the CPF savings have positive impact on aggregate savings. 
When applying the CPF amount due to member (SSi) to measure the mandatory 
savings，equation lA shows that the coefficient of SSi is -0.21 with t-ratio equals 
to -3.73. SSi is significantly negative and increasing one percent of SSi will make 
private consumption dropping by 21 percent. After removing the insignificant 
variable Gi, it makes little change to the significance of SSi as shown in equation 
IB. With shorter sample period and adding U and A65, equation 2A shows that the 
sign of SSi remains negative and significant but the coefficient of SSi has dropped 
to -0.17 with t-ratio equals to -2.14. Although the coefficient of unemployment 
rate U is positive, it is insignificant at 95 percent confidence interval. The 
unemployment rate has maintained rather stable and low in Singapore after 1970， 
and so it is reasonable to find that it has no effect on private consumption. After 
removing U, equation 2B shows that the significance of SSi has improved. The 
pension wealth SSi maintains negative and significant after removing the 
insignificant variables as shown in equation 2C and 2D. 
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Similarly, when applying the CPF amount contributed to measure the 
mandatory savings, equation 3A shows that the coefficient of SS2 is -1.14 with 
t-ratio equals to -4.18. SS2 is also significantly negative and increasing one percent 
of SS2 will make private consumption dropping by 114 percent. After adding U 
and A65, and shorting the sample period, equation 4A indicates that the sign of SS2 
remains negative and significant but the coefficient of SS2 has dropped to -1.03 with 
t-ratio equals to -3.47. The social security variable SS2 remains negative and 
significant after removing the insignificant variables as shown in 4B, 4C, 4D and 4E. 
Comparing the coefficients of SSi with SS2, despite of the coefficients of both 
variables are negative, the depressing effect of SS2 on Ci is much greater than SSi. 
This can be explained by the magnitude of SSi and SS2. The size of SS2 is much 
smaller than SSi； hence, the coefficient of SS2 is greater than SSi. 
The coefficient of government consumption Gi is ranging from 0.08 to 0.4. 
Although Gi is positive, it is insignificant at 95 percent confidence interval in all our 
models. Loh and Veall (1985) showed that government consumption had negative 
impact on private consumption but it was insignificant at 95 percent confidence 
interval. Since there is continuing economic growth in Singapore after 1970 and 
therefore, both private consumption and government consumption can have same 
direction as I mentioned in section 7.3. Loh and Veall gave negative impact of 
government consumption on private consumption because their sample period was 
from 1966 to 1979. The economic performance in that period is worse than the 
economic performance after 1980. Therefore, private consumption and government 
consumption tends to have substitution effect in Loh and Veall's paper. 
6 0 
Secondly, the sign of intercept term INT is positive and agree with Loh and 
Veall's paper. However, INT measuring the marginal propensity to consume in our 
models is smaller than in Loh and Veall's paper. The sample period in Loh and 
Veall's paper is before 1980. During that sample period, income level and CPF 
contribution rates are lower and so higher percentage of income can be consumed 
The CPF contributions have continued increasing until 1985; accordingly, �ess 
percentage of income is left for consumers to consume in Singapore in our sample 
years. Consequently, our models give lower value of marginal propensity to 
consume than Loh and Veall's paper. 
Another variable having the same sign as their paper is Yi (The inverse of per 
capita GDP). The coefficient of Yi is greater than one thousand like the paper in 
Loh and VealL The positive sign of Yi agreed with Feldsteins' argument of 
increasing income lengthen retirement period and therefore, raised the desired wealth 
to income ratio and lower consumption income ratio. 
Finally, the coefficients of Yi and A65 also have the same sign as their paper. 
The coefficient of Yi (the ratio of lagged GDP to current GDP) is positive. 
Therefore, if consumers are anticipated higher income in this period then last period, 
they will increase they consumption in this period (Consumers show habit 
persistence on private consumption). Similarly, the coefficient of A65 (population 
aged 65 and over relative to total population) is also positive. An increase in 
current ratio of retired persons to total population; hence, would increase the fraction 
of people with high propensity to consume and therefore, increase the private 
consumption. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the MPF system in Hong Kong and the CPF system in 
Singapore. Then, the two systems were compared. Afterwards, this paper has 
studied the impact of the CPF on private savings in Singapore. The empirical 
results indicate that the CPF savings has positive impact on aggregate saving in 
Singapore, and the forced saving effect is greater than the substitution effect. 
Hence, the CPF has successfully forced the Singaporeans to save in excess of their 
voluntary savings. Besides, this paper also shows that alternative measures of CPF 
savings do not change the impact of CPF on aggregate savings. Furthermore, with 
24 more observations than Loh and Veall (1985), the regressions in this paper can 
capture better the effect of CPF saving on private consumption. However, there are 
still data limitations and some technical limitations that cannot be eliminated. 
Therefore, our results are still subjecting to errors and have to be treated carefully. 
The contribution rate of the CPF (30 percent of the employee's relevant 
income) in Singapore is three times of the contribution rate of the MPF (10 percent 
of the employee's relevant income) in Hong Kong. Thus, without considering the 
problem of early withdrawal, the forced saving effect of the Singapore's CPF system 
must be greater than the forced saving effect of the Hong Kong's MPF system. 
However, the CPF in Singapore allows extensive early withdrawal as I have 
mentioned in section 3.2 which will offset a large portion of the pension savings 
while no early withdrawal is permitted for the MPF in Hong Kong, accordingly, the 
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actual difference of the pension savings between Hong Kong and Singapore is much 
smaller than the figures. 
To conclude, despite the institutional differences between the CPF in Singapore 
and the MPF in Hong Kong as described in Chapter 4, Singapore's experiences may 
apply to Hong Kong. Hence, T expect that the coming MPF may increase the 
private saving in Hong Kong in long run. Given there is no over saving in Hong 
Kong, increasing capital accumulation can boost the economy because the 
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Table 1 ： The Asset and Monthly Income Limit for Receiving the NOAA in 1998. ^^  
Asset Limits ($) Monthly Income Limits ($) 
For a single person 169,000 5,910 
For a married couple 254,000 9,740 
1 o 
Table 2: The Number of Cases and Amount of Payments for the NOAA and HOAA. 
[ T ^ 11998 11999 
Number of cases (Thousand) 420 444 447 
Amount of Payments (HK$ M i l l i o n ) 2 , 3 3 7 3,238 3,416 
Table 3: The Number of Schemes by Benefit Type under the ORS^^ 
Defined Contribution Scheme 17,544 193% 
Defined Benefit Scheme 1,396 W 
Total 18,940 100% 
Table 4: Contribution Amount by Employers and Employees under the ORS (HK$ 
million)'^ 
Rmployers，Contribution 16,256 75% 
Employees' Contribution 5,333 25% 
T ^ 21,589 100% 
17 Hong Kong Social Welfare Department: 
http ://www. info. gov. hk/swd/html_eng/ ser_sec/soc_secu/index. html 
18 Hong Kong Statistical Department: 
http://www. info. gov. hk/censtatd/hkstat/hkint7sw 1. html 
Download from the homepage of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance: 
http ://www. info. gov. hk/oci. 
Download from the homepage of occupation and insurance market. Note: These statistics are compiled 
on the basis of the latest annual returns filed with the Registrar in respect of 14 522 registered schemes. 
6 9 
Table 5: Economic and Social Conditions in Hong Kong and Singapore in 1998"^ 
Singapore Hong Kong 
Population, mid-year (millions) 3.2 6.7 
Average Annual Growth Rate of Population 1.9 2.4 
： ( 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 8 ) 
丨 Dependency Ratio 
Ratio of people aged below 15 and aged above 65 I 
divided by people aged between 15 to 64 0.42 0.39 | 
；Life Expectancy at Birth (years) j 
：Male 75.2 76.9 | 
Female 79.3 82.3 | 
Infant Mortality (per 1000 live births) 4 5 "j 
Average Annual Growth of Labour Force (92-98) 1.6 2.7 j 
: ！ 
Unemployment Rate 3.2 5.7 j 
i Labour Force Participation Rate 63.9 62.3 | 
I GNP Per Capita (Atlas method, US$) 30,060 2 3 , 6 7 0 |  
^ 
Average Annual Growth of GNP Per Capita 6.7 2.7 I 
(1988-1998) j 
I  
I Average Annual Growth of GNP (1988-1998) 8.9 4.5 
• I 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP) 513 ^ | 
Private Consumption (% of GDP) 3^7 ^ I 
I I ；General Government Consumption (% of GDP) 10.0 9.4 j 
91 




1. Dependency Ratio is the ratio of the number of people aged below 15 and the number of people 
above 65 to the number of people 
2. Life Expectancy at Birth indicates the number of years a new bom infant would live if prevailing 
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
3. Infant Mortality is the number of infants who die before reaching one year of age per 1000 live 
births in a given year. 
4. Gross Domestic Savings is GDP minus total final consumption expenditures. The total 
consumption expenditures cover the consumption by households and the general government. 
5. Private Consumption is the final consumption expenditures made by households and non-profit 
institutions on all goods and services, including consumer durable. It includes the imputed 
value of self-consumed products and the imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings, but 
excluded purchases of dwellings. 
6. General Government Consumption is all current expenditures for purchases of goods and 
services by all levels of government. Government enterprises are excluded, except for those, 
which are likely to hold small working balances, and are highly integrated financial with public 
authorities. 
7. GNP per capita is the gross national product (GOT) in current U.S. dollars as divided by the 
mid-year population. GNP measures the total domestic and foreign income claimed by the 
residents of the economy. It comprises GDP plus net factor income from abroad for factor 
service (labour and capital) less similar payments made to non-residents who contributed to the 
domestic production. GNP in U.S. dollars is calculated according to the World Bank Atlas 
method of conversion from national currency to U.S. dollars terms. 
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Table 6: Regression Results under Ordinary Least Square Method 
1 2 3 4 
1961-1998 1967-1998 1964-1998 1967-1998 
INT 0.45 0.13 0.43 0.43 
(5.59)* (0.60) (7.00)* (2.76)* 
Gi 0.42 1.01 0.57 0.64 
(1.32) (1.87) (2.27)* (1.74) 
Yi -0.02 -0.07 0.08 0.08 
(-0.23) (-0.69) (1.14) (0.95) 
Y) 1428.3 2481.8 1020.3 1291.4 
(13.79/ (4.16/ (8.58/ (2.66)' 
551 -0.16 -0.19 
(-4.47)* (-3.34/ 
552 -1.44 -1.33 
(-7.53)' (-5.83)' 
A65 5.40 -0.15 
(1.80) (-0.08) 
U -0.49 -0.61 
(0.82) (-1.29) 
r2 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.97 
LM 16.85 20.99 18.13 16.74 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DW 0.70 0.53 0.55 0.60 
I 1 
1 
. ‘ * . . � . - - . . . - . . � ..  
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-ratio 
2. Dependent variable is the ratio of private consumption to income 
3. * The coefficient is significant at 95 % confidence interval. 
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Table 8: The CPF Contribution Rates in Various Years 
Effective D a t e [ N o m i n a l Contribution Rates (%) ^ Effective Maximum 
Contribution Monthly 
Employers lEmployees iTotal Rate (%) ^ Contribution ‘ 
Total ( S ^  
July 1955 J ^ J ^ T ^ ^ 
September 1968 6.5 6.5 13.0 12.2 300 
January 1970 8.0 8.0 16.0 14.8 300 
January 1971 10.0 10.0 20.0 18.2 300 
January 1972 14.0 10.0 24.0 21.1 360 
January 1973 15.0 11.0 26.0 22.6 390 
January 1974 15.0 15.0 30.0 26.1 450 
January 1975 15.0 15.0 30.0 26.1 600 
January 1977 15.5 15.5 31.0 26.8 620 
January 1978 16.5 16.5 33.0 28.2 990 
January 1979 20.5 16.5 37.0 31.0 1110 
January 1980 20.5 18.0 38.5 32.0 1155 
January 1981 20.5 22.0 42.5 35.3 1275 
January 1982 20.5 23.0 45.0 36.9 1350 
January 1983 23.0 23.0 46.0 37.4 1380 
November 1983 23.0 23.0 46.0 37.4 1840 
July 1984 25.0 25.0 50.0 40.0 2500 
July 1985 25.0 25.0 50.0 40.0 3000 
April 1986 10.0 25.0 35.0 31.8 2100 
July 1988 12.0 24.0 36.0 32.1 2160 
July 1989 15.0 23.0 38.0 33.0 2280 
July 1990 16.5 23.0 39.5 33.9 2535 
July 1991 17.5 22.5 40.0 34.0 2400 
July 1992 18.0 22.0 40.0 33.9 2400 
M y 1993 18.5 21.5 40.0 33.8 2400 
July 1994 20.0 20.0 40.0 33.3 2400 
January 1999 d |lQ.O |20.Q IsO.Q 27.3 \ i m  
Notes: 
a: The contribution rates apply to monthly wages exceeding $363 per month. For those earning 
below this level, the rates are lower. Since July 1988, the rates have also been lower for those 
above 55 years of age. 
b: Contributions as a share of total gross wage including employers' CPF contribution 
reflective 二 (1"」+1"亡)/(1+犷。） 
Where rj = nominal employees rate 
Fg = nominal employers rate 
c: The maximum amount in this column applies to those below 55 years of age. The maximum 
contribution is lower for those above 55 years of age. Moreover, the maximum applies only to 
ordinary wages. For additional wages, such as bonuses, statutory contribution rates apply 
without limits. Thus, actual CPF contribution may exceed the maximum specified in the 
column. 
d: The cut is initial planned for two years. For those between aged 55 and 60, the contribution 
rate is 16.5 percent (4 percent by the employers and 12.5 percent by the employees); for those 
between 60 and 65 years of age, the contribution rate is 9.5 percent (2 percent by the employers 
and 7.5 percent by the employees); for those above 65 years of age, the contribution rate is 7 
percent (2 percent by employers and 5 percent by the employees). 
Source: Asher (1999) pg.32 table 2 
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Table 9: Various Schemes under the CPF System^^ 
Type Scheme Year Introduced 
Home Approved housing Scheme 1968 
Ownership 
Investment Approved Residential Property Scheme 1981 
Singapore Bus Services (1978) Ltd. Share Scheme 1978 
Approved Investment Scheme 1986'' 
Approved Non-Residential Properties Scheme 
(ANRPS) 1986 
CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS) 1997 ^  
Share-Ownership Top-Up Scheme (SOTUS) 1993 
Insurance Home Protection Insurance Scheme 1982 
Dependents Protection Insurance Scheme 1989 
Medishield Scheme 1990 
Others Company Welfarism through Employers Contribution 
(COWEC) Scheme ‘ 1984 
Medisave Scheme 1984 d 
Minimum Sum Scheme 1987 
Topping-up of the Minimum Sum Scheme 1987 
Financing of Tertiary Education in Singapore 19 89 
CPF Top-Up Scheme 1995 
a From October 1993, divided into basic and enhanced investment schemes. 
b From January 1, 1997, CPFIS replaced the Approved Investment Scheme, thus elimination 
distinction between the Basic and Enhanced Investment Schemes 
c From 1, January 1999, no more new contributions will be made to the CPWEC fund. The 
scheme; therefore, is effectively discontinued. 
d From 1993, seif-employed persons must contribute to the Medisave scheme. 
22 Source: Asher (1999) pg. 9 table 1. 
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Table 10: CPF Contribution and Allocation Rates of Private Sector and Public Sector 
(Non-Pensionable) 
23 
Rates effective from January 1, 1999. 
Employee Contribution Contribution Total Credited Into 
Age By By Contribution 
(Years) Employer Employee (% of wage) Ordinary Special | Medical 
(o/o of wage) (% of wage) Account Account Account 
(%) (%) (%) 
35 and 10 20 30 24 0 6 
below  
Above 35 10 ^ ^ ^ 0 7 
to 45 
Above 45 10 ^ 30 22 0 8 
to 55 
Above 55 4 K s 16.5 8.5 0 8 
to 60 
Above 60 2 7 3 ^ 0 8 
to 65 
Above 65 2 5 7 0 0 7 
Rates effective from April 1，2000. 
Employee Contribution Contribution Total Credited Into 
Age By By Contribution 
(Years) Employer Employee (% of wage) Ordinary Special I Medical 
(% of wage) (o/o of wage) Account Account Account 
(%) (o/o) (%) 
35 and 12 W ^ ^ 2 6 
below  
Above 35 12 W 32 23 2 7 
to 45 
Above 45 12 ^ 32 22 2 8 
to 55 
Above 55 1Z5 17 9 0 8 
to 60 
Above 60 7 3 10 2 0 8 
to 65 
Above 65 2 3 5 T5 0 0 7.5 
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